Natural Capital & The Energy Transition
Paid to Miss the Target
By DWN-team · Oct 12, 2026 Views: 25
By Thomas Fugelsang, Managing Director, Entoro Capital, LLC
This article is the last in a series of three on methane finance.
The previous piece in this series looked at use-of-proceeds financing. Transition bonds can now direct capital toward methane abatement, but the investor's return does not necessarily depend on how much methane the project actually eliminates.
Sustainability-linked bonds take the opposite approach. The proceeds can support general corporate purposes, while the financial or structural terms of the bond change according to the issuer's performance against predefined sustainability targets.
That sounds closer to what methane needs.
The problem is how weak that connection has often been.
The 25-basis-point problem
Coupon step-ups became the dominant mechanism in the early sustainability-linked bond market. If an issuer misses its target, the bondholder receives a higher coupon.
Climate Bonds Initiative's 2024 review found coupon step-ups in 58 percent of SLBs, representing 77 percent of issuance by value. The average step-up was just 24.8 basis points per target. The same review found only 14 percent of bonds, and 17 percent of issuance volume, aligned with its climate methodology, citing weaknesses in target calibration, structural features and transition plans.
The question is whether the penalty is large enough to change behavior.
An early study by Julian Kölbel and Adrien-Paul Lambillon compared SLBs with conventional bonds from the same issuers. In their sample, the financing benefit associated with issuing an SLB was, on average, greater than the maximum potential penalty for missing the sustainability target. The authors cautioned that the market was young and their evidence preliminary, but concluded that more than a third of the SLBs they studied offered issuers a financing benefit larger than the maximum possible penalty.
That does not mean issuers want to miss their targets. It means a penalty can exist without being economically material enough to drive the investment decision.
Timing matters too
The size of the step-up is only part of the structure.
IFC research found that sustainability targets were frequently tested late in a bond's life and that call options could, in some structures, reduce the amount of penalty ultimately paid. The issue is not unique to SLBs, and Climate Bonds later concluded that misuse of call options was not then a major market-wide problem, but both analyses point to the same design question: when does the financial consequence actually become meaningful?
For methane, waiting years to test an issuer-wide emissions target can also be a poor match for the underlying project.
A compressor repair either reduces emissions or it does not. A vapor-recovery system can be monitored after installation. The IEA says methane detection and measurement have improved substantially, but also cautions that no single technology captures every source reliably; robust measurement increasingly combines satellite, airborne and ground-based systems.
That creates an opportunity for something more granular than a corporate target checked once near maturity.
Separate the debt from the outcome
The answer is not simply to reverse an SLB and make the issuer pay bondholders more whenever methane falls. That would create a new problem: successful environmental performance would increase the issuer's financing cost.
A cleaner structure is to separate the two economics.
The debt can remain conventional, with principal and interest based on credit risk. A separate payment can be tied to independently verified methane abatement and funded from whatever value the reduction creates, whether recovered gas, an environmental buyer, a contractual offtaker or another defined revenue source.
The investor willing to underwrite delivery then receives the performance-linked economics. The fixed-income investor does not have to turn a conventional lending claim into a bet on tonnes.
The Bottom Line
Across these three pieces, the financing problem has narrowed.
Methane can be detected. The equipment exists. Transition bonds can now finance eligible methane-abatement expenditures. Sustainability-linked bonds have shown that debt terms can respond to environmental performance.
The remaining question is how directly.
For methane, the most useful unit may not be an issuer-wide target or a modest coupon penalty years in the future. It may be a verified reduction at a defined asset, with a contract that assigns economic value when that reduction actually occurs.
The next step is not another label.
It is making the outcome itself part of the transaction.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Entoro, LLC, or any of their respective affiliates. This article is provided for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, financial product, or investment strategy. The information presented is believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. Any forward-looking statements or opinions are subject to change without notice.
Author Bio: Thomas P. Fuglesang is a Managing Director at Entoro Capital, LLC and Capturiant, LLC, with over 25 years of experience in energy, shipping, commodities, and real estate. He specializes in corporate finance, investment banking, private wealth management, and equity sales, with deep expertise in structuring transactions and developing international capital market solutions. At Entoro and Capturiant, he leads structuring, capital markets advisory, and business development for environmental and alternative investment products.Previously, Thomas spent over 17 years as Managing Director at Absalon Capital Ltd, overseeing projects in oil services, shipping, and commodities, while holding multiple senior roles including Board Director and CFO. Earlier in his career, he held roles at Morgan Stanley (Private Wealth Management and Associate in Luxembourg), Credit Suisse (Investment Banking, Transportation/Shipping), and Pareto Securities (Equity Sales).
Thomas has extensive capital markets experience in capital raising, M&A, governance, advisory, and execution of large-scale international transactions. His leadership roles have included Board Director at CAPOL and Ascot Energy Services, CFO of Newport Shipping LLP, and Director at Ohlsson International Ltd and SeaHold Group.
He holds CFA Level I, the Investment Administration Qualification, and Capital Markets & Securities Analyst certification. His academic background includes an MSc in Shipping, Trade & Finance from Bayes Business School (London), and a BA in Business Economics from Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium) and Augsburg University (Minneapolis).
Thomas is recognized for bridging traditional and emerging sectors and structuring innovative solutions for corporate and institutional clients globally.